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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
H. C. HARGRAVES, Building Inspector
for S.ALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

Case No. 8275

HARRY L. YOUNG, KENNETH L.
ANDER.SON, and WILLIAM W ALKENHORST,
Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

'S'TATEMENT OF· F ACT·S
This appeal is from an order of the Third District
Court sustaining a motion of the defendants for summary
judgment. The action raises a question as to the interpretation and validity of certain zoning ordinances of
Salt Lake City.
The defendants in this action are all residents of Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Each of
the three defendants, at a different location in Salt Lake
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City, has constructed ana n1aintains what is commonly
known as a fixed patio cover or carport without be'ing
issued a permit hy the proper authorities of Salt Lake
City. The defendants applied to the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City for a variance in the zoning
ordinances to permit them to maintain the fixed patio
covers or carports. Defendants also proposed an ordinance, the effect o:f which was to amend the zoning ordinances to permit the type of structures involved herein.
The Commission failed and refused to adopt the proposed ordinance and the Board of Adjustment, under
date of May 24,. 1954, denied the request of defendants
for a variance.
Under date· of July 13, 1954, the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City ordered steps taken to effect
the removal of the fixed patio covers or carports. Defendants advised the City Commission that they intended
to retain the structures and asked that steps be taken
immediately to obtain a ruling from thB courts as to the
application and validity of the zoning ordinances as they
relate to these structures. ·Thereafter, under date of August 23, 1954, a complaint was filed on behalf of the City
praying for an order of the court directing these defendants to remove the fixed patio cOivers or carports
from their p·resent locations within 30 days.
At the argument of this matter before the Third
Judicial District ·Court, counsel 'for defendants advised
the court that William Walkenhorst, one of the defend-
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ants named herein, had purchased additional property
adjoining his premises so that under the City's view of
the case, such defendant would not now be in violation
of the city zoning ordinances and by stipulation of counsel for plaintiff and defendants the action was dismissed
as to William Walkenhorst. After argument, but without
taking testimony, as requested by counsel for plaintiff,
the Third Judicial District Court under date of September 20, 1954, granted the motion of defendants for summary judgment. This appeal is taken to this court from
that ruling.
ARGUMENT
A. .THIS IS. NO·T A PROPER CASE F'OR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE
(1) Fails to conform to the requirements of Rule
56 (h).
(2) F'ails to conform to the require·ments of Rule
56 (c).
B. DEF'ENDANTS SHOULD HAVE. PUR.S.UED
REMED·Y PROVIDED BY 10-9-15, UTAH CODE
ANNOT'ATED 1953.
C.

THE Z:ONING REGULATIONS IN QUE·STION.
(1) Exclude the type of structures involved in this
action .
.(2) Are a proper exercise of the police power.

A.

THIS IS NOT A PR,OPER CA;SE F'OR SUMMARY
JUD~GMENT BECAUSE
(1) Fails to conform to the requirements of Rule
56 (b).
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Rule 56 ('b) provides :

"A party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or
without sup·porting affidavits 'for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
As we can see from the wording of the section, summary judgment is limited to situations where the action
is brought against a party against whom a "claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought." It hardly seems to require argument or
citation of authority to show that the defending parties in
this case do not fall within any of the classifications set
out in the rule. Obviously, a counterclaim or cross-claim
is not being asserted against defendants. Likewise, too, a
declaratory judgment is not being sought. We have been
unable to find any case which has held that the word
''claim" in the rule, which is the only remaining portion
of the rule which defendants could come under, has been
held to include the type of action brought by plaintiffs
in the District Court.

A.

THIS IS NO·T A PROPER CA·SE FOR SUMMARY
JtJDGMEN·T BECAUSE
·(2) Fails to conform to the requirements of Rule

56 (c).
Rule 56 (c) p-rovides :
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"The motion shall be served a.t least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount
of damages."
As will be noted the rule provides that summary
judgment should not be granted if there is an issue as to
any material fact. In the immediate case the issue might
well resolve itself as to whether or not there is any reasonable relationship between the prohibiting .of such
structures in side yards and the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the inhabitants of Salt L'ake
City. Now who is going to provide information that will
help us to decide this point. All of us can sit in our respective offices and form our own conclusions in this
matter based upon limited, or no experience with the subject matter. It seems apparent that persons who have
made a very thorough and an analytical study of the relationship between density in population, fire hazards, the
health of the population, the efficient movement of
traffic, and other matters directly affecting our every
day health and welfare would be the appropriate parties
to advise us on this subject. Certainly, experts from the
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Fire Department, the Health Department, Traffic Department, Zoning Department, and perhaps others, who
have studied the effect of the zoning ordinances on the
health and welfare of the population should be brought
into the picture to show the results of their studies.
Otherwise, we are left up· to our own individual opinions
without the benefit of information showing why particular zoning ordinances were adopted and why perhaps a
side yard of 6 feet was required rather than a side yard
of 4 or 8 feet. To most of us., with little reflection on the
subject, we would fail to see why a zoning ordinance
should provide for a maximum of 12 story buildings
rather than 10 or 14 story buildings and it might be hard
for us to see why the zoning ordinance would prohibit
two families of two each in one dwelling but would not
prohibit one family of ten members in the same dwelling.
Likewise, it might not be readily ap·parent to us why one
lawn umbrella would he permissible whereas a fixed or
structural carport or patio eover would he p·rohibited.
The anslwers to these questions are found in comprehen·sive studies which have been made in numerous cities
showing the relationship· ·between cause and effect in
such matters and showin·g also the tendencies which have
been found to develop if apparently innocuous steps are
p·ermitted to be taken in the first place .
.As was stated by this court in the case of State ex
rel. Civello v. New· Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 22
.A.L.R. 2'60, which dealt with zoning ordinances:
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"It is not necessary, for the validity of the
ordinances in question, that w·e should deem the
ordinances justified by considerations of public
health, safety, comfort, or the general welfare. It
is sufficient that the m.unicipal council could reasonably have ha:d such considerations in mind. If
such considerations could have justified the ordinances, we must a:ssume that they did justify
them." (Italics added.)
How can we know what considerations might have
influenced the adoption of zoning plans without further
information on the subject~
The case of People v. Leighton, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 779,
deals with the very question of the necessity for evidence
in such cases. In the Leighton case defendant was convicted of violating city zoning ordinance. At the trial defendant attempted to introduce evidence in the matter
to prove that the ordinance, in its application to defendant's premises, was an improper exercise of the police
power. Such evidence was excluded by the trial court
and testimony was limited to the question as to whether
ordinance had been validly adopted and whether defendant had constructed two family house.
The court in deciding that the proffered testimony
should have been admitted stated. "T'he burden of proof
to show the unreasonableness of a municipal ordinance
rests upon the person asserting it. However, the defendant here was unable to meet such burden by the reason
of the exclusion of any and all evidence offered on the
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subject. This court, therefore, has no evidence before it
upon which it can pass in determining the validity of the
ordinance in its application to defendant's pre~mises.
Whether the defendant on a· new trial can meet the
burden of establishing the unreasonableness of the ordinance remains to he seen. She is at least entitled to present her proof on the subject."
B.

D·EF'E:NDANTS SHOULD HA·VE PUR.SUED
REMED·Y PROVIDED BY 10-9-15, UTAH C·OD·E
ANNOT'ATED 1953.
1

Section 10-9-15·, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides.:
"JUDICIAL REVIEW O·F BOARD-'S. DECI'SION_:TTME~ LIMIT.ATION.- The city or any
p·erson aggrieved by any decision of the board of
adjustment may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of competent
jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is
p·resented to the court within thirty days after the
filing of :such decision in the office of the board."
Thus it seems ap·p·arent that defendants after their bout
with the board of adjustment should have sought assistance from any court of competent jurisdiction. Under an
amendment which was made to 10-9-1'5 in 1949 such application would have to be made to the court within 30
days after the filing of th-e decision of the board of adjustment.
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We think the Utah case of Provo City v. Claudin, 63
Pac. 2d 570 is very pertinent to this point. In that case
the City of Provo sought an injunction against defendants to restrain them from operating a funeral home in
violation of city ordinance. In the case it appeared that
defendant, C. 0. Claudin, made an application to establish
a funeral home, upon the pre·mises in question, to the
board of adjustment in and for Provo City and that
thereafter said Board denied the request of defendant
Claudin. As to this point the court stated:
"Doubtless the Claudins would not have been
interested in protesting the classification at the
time of the public hearings unless at that time
they des'ired to establish a mortuary in the district. But if later, when they were desirous of so
doing and they conceived that the ordinance is in
itself unfair in the manner specified, to wit, that
the Class "B" District really includes territory
which was at the time of the passage of the ordinance commercial in character or since has become
so, they should have called the attention of the city
commission or zoning commission, whichever body
is the one to whom an applicant should first apply,
to the matter and obtained a ruling from such
body, and then from that ruling, if adverse, have
taken an appeal to the courts. Certainly the incorrect procedure is to remodel the structure for
a purpose prohibited in the zone by the ordinance,
and then, as a defense to an injunction suit, hit
the city with the plea of an unfair ordinance."
If defendants in the immediate case, or in any other
case, may fail to obtain a permit to build and thereafter

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
disregard the decision of the Board of Adjustment there
is no purpose in 10-9-15. This ·section merely becon1es
surplusage and of no consequence.
C.

THE .ZONING R.EGULATI·ONS IN QUESTION.
(1) Excludes the type of structures involved in this
action.

The zoning regulations wh'ich apply to this problem
state; Section 6725 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, 1944:
"In all Residential 'A' 'A-3' 'B-2' districts
for every building erected ' there ' shall ' be a side'
yard along each lot line. ;The least dimension of
any such slide yard shall he 35 p·er cent of the
building height, but in no case less than eight '(8)
feet for Residential 'A' and A-3' * * *"

'

·Section 672:7, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
1944:
The area of a side or rear yard shall
be op-en and unobstructed, excep't for the ordinary p·rojections of window sills, belt courses, cornices and other ornamental features to the. extent
of not more than four (4) inches except that where
the building is not more than two ('2) stories in
height the cornice or eaves may p·roject not more
than two (2') feet into such yard * * *"
."'(a)

"·(b} An o~pen iron fire escap,e may p·roject
not more than four (4) feet into a side or rear

yard."
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Thus, in reading the two sections quoted, it seems
apparent that a side yard of at least 8 feet is required
in this district and, further, that such side yard shall be
"open and unobstructed," with exceptions noted therein
which do not concern us in this case. It would appear
that the words "open and unobstructed" particularly
when understood in connection with zoning ordinances
and building codes not only in Utah, but throughout the
country, mean just that. In the very section with which
we are dealing, we note that exceptions are made for the
eaves, chimney, etc., and in other sections of the code
there are numerous references to fences, shrubbery and
other obstructions of all kinds and descriptions. Therefore, we reach the conclusion that if there were to be
exceptions, in addition to those set out in Section 6727,
the ordinances would have made provisions for the same.
Section 426 of the Uniform Building C:ode, which has
been adopted by Salt Lake City, defines a yard to be
"an open, unoccupied spaee, other than a court, unobstructed from the ground to the sky except where specifically provided by this code on a lot on which the building is situated.''
Section 404 of the same code defines a court to be
"an open unoccupied space bounded on two or more sides
'by the walls of a building." Thus, by definition contained
in the Uniform Building Code we are forced to the conclusion that a yard is an open unoccupied space unobstructed from the ground to the sky on the lot on which
the building is situated. Therefore, the only conclusion
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""e can reach is that the ordinance, in talking of an open
and unobstructed side yard, means that it shall be open,
unobstructed and unoccupied except for enumerated exceptions in the ordinances. Any other construction of
the ordinance would leave it up to the whiln, desire and
caprice of each property owner to decide just what little
bit of obstruction they should put up without being in
violation of the ordinance. We respectfully suggest the
only exceptions are included in the ordinance'S and if a
variance is not given, the property owner is not to go
beyond these exceptions. The only remedy is to obtain
a variance, if it is justified. A variance was requested
in this case and after thorough consideration denied.
C.

THE ZONING REGULATIONS IN QUES!TION.
:(2) Are a proper exercise of the police power.

Comprehensive zoning laws and ordinances have repeatedly been upheld since the landmark case of Euclid
v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365. That case and substant'ially all of the ca~ses since that time on ~the question
have stood squarely for the proposition that comprehensive zoning laws and ordinances prescribing, among
other things, the height of buildings to be erected and the
extent of the area to be left op~en for light and air and
in aid of fire protection, etc., are, in their general scope,
valid under the F'ederal Constitution.
The Supreme Court of the United States while rendering its decision in the case of Gorieb v. Fox, 71 L. ed.
605, went on to say:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

"It is hard to see any controlling difference
between regulations which require the lot owner
to leave open areas at the sides and rear of his
house and limit the extent of his use of the space
above His lot and a regulation which requires him
to set his building a reasonable distance back from
the street. Each inte-rferes in the same way, if not
to the same extent, with the owner's general right
of dominion over his property. All rest for their
justification upon the same reasons which have
arisen in recent times as a result of the great increase and concentration of population in urban
communities and the vast changes in the extent
and complexity of the problems in modern city
life. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., supra, p. 386.
State legislatures and ·city councils, who deal with
the situation from a practical standpoint, are
better qualified than the courts to determine the
neces~sity character and degree of regulation which
these new and perplexing conditions require; and
their conclusions should not be disturbed by the
courts unless clearly arbitrary and unreasonable."
The State Legislature of Utah granted considerable
authority to cit'ies to promulgate and adopt zoning regulations. 10-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 19'53, provides: ,
"For the purpose of_ promoting health,
safety, morals and the general welfare of the
community the legislative body of cities and towns
is empowered to regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories and size of buildings and other
structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open
spaces, the density of population and the location
and use of buildings, structures and land for
trade, industry, residence or other purposes."
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10-9-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides :

"For any or all of said p·urposes the legislative body may divide the municipality into districts of such number, shap·e and area as may be
deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of
tni~s article, and within such districts it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of buildings
or structures, or the use of land. All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of
buildings throughout each district, but the regulation in one district may differ from those in other
districts."
10..9-3, Ut:ah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:

'''Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan designed to lessen
congestion in the streets, to secure safety from
fire, panic and other dangers, to promote health
and the general welfare to provide adequate light
and air, to prevent the overcrow4ing of land, to
avdid undue ·concentration of population, to facilitate adequate provision for transportation, wate1·,
sewage, 'Schools, parks and other p·ublic requirements. Such regulations shall he made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to
the character of the district and its p~eculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging
the most ap·propriate use of land throughout the
city."
All of these sections sh.ow a legislative intent to give the
city plenary power in regard to zoning.
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10-9-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"Whenever the regulations made under authority of this article require a greater width or
size of yards, courts or other open spaces, or require a lower height of buildings or less number
of stories, or require greater percentage of lot
to be left unoccupied, or impose other higher
standards than are required in any other statute
or local ordinance or regulation, the provisions of
the regulations made under authority of this
article shall govern. Wherever the provisions of
any other statute or local ordinance or regulation
require a greater width or size of yards, courts
or other open spHces, or require a lower height
of building or a less number of stories, or require
a greater percentage of lot to be left unoccupied,
or impose other higher standards than are required by the regulations made under authority of
this article, the provisions of such statute, or local
ordinance or regulation shall govern."
This section likewise indicates a legislative intent
to leave a maximum of open and unoccupied space. This
section specifically states that if there is any 'S'tatute
or local ordinance which imposes less restrictive standards that are imposed by the regulations made pursuant
to the authority of this article, the regulations shall govern. This validity to obtain even in the face of a contradictory statute enacted by the Legislature of the State
of Utah.

In the case of Potts v. Boar'd of Adjustment (N.J.)
1945, 43 A. 2d 850, p~laintiff challenged action of Board
of Adjustment in denying h'is ap~plication for leave. to
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convert his single family dwelling into a two fa1nily
apartment house within the present structure and framework of the dwelling. The ordinance restricted the area
in question and did not permit two family dwellings.
The houses were rather close together in the area and
there were very limited side yards. Plaintiff alleged that
Board action was arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory; contrary to the intent and purpose of the
zoning act, and that the Board had previously granted
p·ermission for two family dwellings in same district.
The court upheld decision of Board and stated:
· "The inquiry is whether the board has conformed to the legislative formula; and when
there has been a valid and reasonable exercise of
the delegated power, there is no occasion for judicial interference. The legislative authority has
confided the determination of the question of variances and special exceptions to the sp·ecialized
judgment of the zoning hoard; and this court may
intervene only when the general regulation or
the action taken by the subordinate agency is arbitrary, cap~ricious or unreasonable. It may not
substitute its judgment for that of the zoning
board."
Boar:d1n(Jjyt v. Davis) et al.J (City of Marshalltown,

Intervenor), 3 N. W. 2d 608:
"The Municipal Zoning La,v, Chapter 324,
Code of 19·39, empowers cities and towns to adopt
compre.hensive zoning ordinances. The constitutionality of such statutes and ordinances enacted
thereunder have been generally sustained as a

'
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valid exercise of the police power, in the interest
of public peace, order, morals, health, safety, cornfort, convenience and the general welfare .
."The authorities recognize that a zoning ordinance, which rests upon the police power of the
state ma_y, and often does, lay an uncompensated
'burden upon some property ovvners. However,
such requirements do not constitute an easement
upon the property. Nor do they deprive the owner
of his property as in the case of an appropriation
by eminent domain for some specific public use.
They are merely a restraint upon the owner's
use of the property for the protection of the general well-being or in other words to prevent harm
to the public. In determining the validity of the
police regulation the prime consideration must be
the general purpose and relationship of the ordinance and not th·e hardship of an individual case.
"In general, the authorities above cited enunciate the doctrine that set-hack provisions of an
ordinance will not be held invalid unless they
clearly appear to be arbitrary and unreasonable.
Although there are some contrary holdings this
is the doctrine of the majority of the more recent cases. It appears to be sound and to be consistent with the position taken by this court in
Anderson v. Jester, supra, and in Des Moines v.
Manhattan Oil ·Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 183 N.W. 832,
188 N.W. 92'1, 23 A.L.R. 1322."

Oliva v. City of Garfield, 62 A. 2d 677:
"One attacking a zoning ordinance as unreasonable in its application is met with the· presumption that it is reasonable and must hear the burden
of establishing the contrary. Repp v. Shahadi,
Sup. 1944, 132 N.J.L. 2'4, 38 A. 2d 284; Yoemans
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v. Hillsborough Tp·. Sup. Ct. 1947, 135 N.J.L. 599,
54 A. 2d 202; Crow v. Town of Westfield, supra.
We find from the record b·efore us that the plaintiff has not met this burden and that the amendatory ordinance does not violate the constitutional
guaranties upon which she relies."
There have been a number of Utah cases recently on
the subject of zoning including the Phi Kappa case and
the Dowse case.
Phi KapVJ?a Iota Fraterity v. Salt Lake City, 212
P. 2d 177.

In this cas'e the zoning authority of Salt Lake City
was challenged in regard to the zoning limitation placed
on dormitories, fraternities or sorority houses. The
court points out that 10-9-1, and following, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, grant the governing body of the city
the discretionary power to district and zone cities for
various purposes that are to the public interest and the
exercise of that power will not be interfered with unless
th·e discretion is abused. The court goes on to say:
"·There are, of course, various solutions for
zoning p~roblems such as this ; and opinions may
differ as to which is the more efficacious. But it
is not for the court to weigh the respective merits
of these solutions. That is the duty that lies upon
th·e shoulders of the governing body which is by
statute authorized to district and zone cities. The
selection of one method of solving the p~roblem in
p·re.ference to another is entirely within the discretion of the commission ; and does not, in and
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of itself, evidence an abuse of discretion. If
changes' have developed which indicate that a dispersal of fraternities and sororities will better
solve the ~problem, that is a matter for submission
to the commission; and not one for the courts.''
Dowse .v. Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P. 2d 723:
Plaintiff alleged that his land was unsuitable for
residential property; that it was located in a potential
industrial or commercial zone; that the zoning ordinance,
as applied to his property, serves no beneficial use and in
no manner promotes the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the community; that the value of his property
would he greatly enhanced if it could be used for industrial purposes; and that under these circumstances the
zoning ordinance is so opp-ressive as to be confiscatory
and unlawful. The court sustained the city's motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground it failed to state
a cause of action. The court went on to say:
''In this jurisdiction the discretionary power
to district and zone cities for various purposes incident to the public interest is' granted to the governing body of the city by statute, section
10-9-1, 2, 3, U.C.A. 1953. Palpably the exercise of the zoning power is a legislative function and activity. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust
Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P. 2d 724, 726. The wisdom of
the plan, the necessity, the number, nature and
boundaries of the district are matters which lie in
the discretion of the City authorities, and only
if their action is confiscatory, discriminatory or
arbitrary may the court set aside their action.
Marshall v. Salt Lake ·City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.
2d 704, 149 A.L.R. 282. The fact that plaintiff's
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one-half lot might be more p-rofitably us~ed for
commercial than for residential purposes, or
indeed the fact that it has become unsuited for
reside~tial purposes does not show discrimination or reveal arbitrary action."

In West Bros. Brick Co. v . .Alexan.dria, 169 \Ta. 271,
192 s. E. 881, the court said:
"Zoning ordinances, in the main, deal not
with p·resent conditions, but with conditions to
come. ·They are not designed to Haussmanize a
city, but to guide its future growth. Necessarily
any plans of that nature must he in some degree
arbitrary. It is seldom that there is any definite
reason for holding that a lot on one side of a line
should be devoted to one purpose and that just
across it to another. The adaptability of certain
terri to rial sections of cities to certain uses fade
into each other. One end of a field may be, beyond
preadventure, suited to industrial developments,
the other to private homes. Intervening there
must be a twilight zone. If the legislature cannot
be relied upon to say where lines must run, who
can be vested with that discretion~ Demonstrative
accuracy is an imp·ossibility."
This case sums up· the p·ractical aspects of any zoning regulation. .
We, of course, should note that we are not concerned
with just one or even two buildings' which are the subject
of this action. If only these two buildings. were involved
it would be relatively inconsequential. However, the
effect of the decision of the District Court is to p·ermit
carports and patios, not only of the type involved in this
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action, but of every other kind, type and description, to
spring up on every lot in 'Salt Lake City. F'urthermore,
such construction is not limited to one side but they might
appear on either side, on both sides, on the front or on
the back. If they may have a plastic roof presumably
they could have a cement or a shingled roof. Thus, we
see that in reaching a conclusion in the immediate case
\Ve must bear in mind not so much the affect of these
structures but the likely affect of all the structures which
will immediately spring up all over the city if the decision
of the District Court is sustained. It is my recollection
that counsel for the defendants at the argument of the
case before the District Court suggested that there are
already hundreds of these structures springing up, and
his concern with the ordinance was largely prompted
by a desire on the part of a number of firms to immediately construct hundreds more.
We might draw some analogy between the present
restriction in the ordinance and a restrictive ordinance
regulating or eliminating dogs under the city's police
power. In any given case it might readily be possible
for the defendant to come in and show that his dog was
well cared for and well behaved. He might easily establish that the children in the neighborhood enjoyed playing with the dog and as a result of its existence it contributed to, rather than detracted from, the general
health, safety and welfare in the vicinity. It would seem,
however, that if the ordinance had, as its over-all purpose
and effect, the control of not one dog but thousands
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throughout the city and that the net effect of the over-all
control was beneficial with respect to the health, safety,
welfare and general well-being of all the citizens, the
ordinance would be sustained under the police power.
In the immediate case it might be noted, also, that defendants have made no showing as the cases seem torequire in order to overcome the presumption of validity.
The need for vision of the future in the government
of cities does not lessen with the years. To the extent
the cities become more crowded, even grea;ter vision and
planning are needed. Certainly a minor restraint in
beneficial enjoyment should be approved in the general
public interest when a wide spTead disregard of a minor
restraint would result in a major building infiltration of
side and hack yard space throughout the city.
We respectfully submit the decision of the District
C:ourt should be reversed.

Attorneys for

App~ellant
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